Deliberative systems theory and citizens’ use of online media: testing a critical theory of democracy on a high achiever by Holst, Cathrine & Moe, Hallvard
 1 
Deliberative systems theory and citizens’ use of online media: testing a critical theory of 




Deliberative systems theory has recently attracted substantial scholarly attention. The theory, 
developed to assess real world democracies ‘at the large scale’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012), 
introduces a new phase in the evolution of theories of deliberative democracy, and is initially 
promising. Based on some of the central moral intuitions that underlie democratic 
commitments, deliberative systems theory seems to formulate normative demands on a 
democratic rule of government suitable for societies characterized by a ‘reasonable pluralism’ 
of values (Rawls, 1993; Author 1, 2017). At the same time, this theory seemingly fares better 
than many competing theories in striking a balance between ideal requirements and 
feasibility. Normative political theories are frequently accused of setting up unfeasible ideals; 
unrealizable for any actually existing political community, even under the most favourable 
conditions (List and Valentini, 2018). However, deliberative systems theory is neither 
obviously idealized, nor so ‘concessive’ (Estlund, 2008), that it fails to provide a corrective to 
the actual institutions and practices of democratic politics. The theory seems thus to be a good 
candidate for a critical theory of democracy that could guide us in pinpointing democratic 
problems based on sound and non-utopian assessment standards.  
 
The systems turn needs, however, to be scrutinized more closely. Based on recent debates on 
‘feasibility’ in normative political theory (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012), and with a 
focus on the normative role of the public sphere and how to assess citizens’ online media use 
from a democratic perspective, this paper contributes to a critique and refinement of 
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deliberative systems theory. Online media use is a democratic practice with increasing 
salience, and it is a fair expectation to any normative democratic theory that it also helps us to 
conceptualize and assess political behaviour in digital domains. The paper reviews recent 
contributions on the role of the public sphere and online democracy from a deliberative 
systems perspective, and identifies four limitations: i) an incomplete account of the public 
sphere’s epistemic function; ii) too rough interpretations of participatory levels; iii) 
shortcomings in the understanding of online media, and iv) a context-insensitive approach to 
policy reform. Addressing these weaknesses, the paper argues for a revised version of 
deliberative systems theory, and highlights how this revised version is not only more in line 
with our intuitions of good democratic practice, but also makes the theory more feasible. 
 
However, to be fully convincing, revisions of a theory intended for the evaluation of real-
world cases should also matter in practice: It should make a difference for assessments of 
concrete political behavior and organization whether deliberative systems theory are applied 
with or without our amendments.. In addition, such concrete assessments can make us aware 
of over- or under-idealized assessment standards. This paper concentrates on testing for over-
idealization, relying on online media use in Norway as a test case.  
 
The analysis of the Norwegian case shows not only that the revisions have practical 
significance, but also that they contribute to make deliberative systems theory and the 
implications of this theory more compatible with existing democracy research and 
assessments of democratic quality. We take such compatibility to be a prima facie indicator of 
appropriate feasibility. Specifically, applying our revised criteria, we find the online sphere in 
Norway to have a range of democratic credentials, in accordance with what we would expect 
in a country ranked as number one on international democracy rankings. Still, central 
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challenges remain, such as significant social stratifications in media use and how to ensure 
online media’s informational function, reminding us that even ‘best practice’ may depart 
substantively from our ideals, even in their feasible version. This calls for democratic reforms 
that work with existing path-dependencies, and we exemplify what this can imply in the 
Norwegian setting.  
 
The next part of the paper briefly presents the debate on feasibility in normative political 
theory, and introduces the theory of deliberative systems as a promising candidate of a theory 
that is at the same time critical and feasible. Still, this theory has some blindspots in its 
approach to the role of the public sphere, and to online democratic practice in particular. The 
third part of the paper elabourates on the four identified shortcomings, and spells out the 
corresponding elements of a revised systems approach. Against this background, in the fourth 
section we review studies of the use of online media in Norway, focusing especially on the 
role of social media (for a definition, see Author 2, 2016). We show that our theoretical 
revisions make a difference compared to a not-amended version, and that our revised version 
is likely to have made deliberative systems theory more relevant and applicable. A final 
section concludes and highlights some limitations of our endeavour. 
 
 
2. Between idealism and realism: the deliberative systems approach 
Normative political theory has a mixed reputation among social scientists. Many would agree 
that this branch of theorizing offers a stringent conceptualization of ideal requirements. Yet, 
empirically oriented scholars often complain that normative theories disregard feasibility 
constraints and lack a proper understanding of the prerequisites for institution building, 
consolidation, and political reform (for example Rothstein, 1998). Accordingly, when social 
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scientists assess institutional developments and policies, they often sidestep discussions in 
normative political theory, and instead consult alternative approaches to evaluation and policy 
recommendation, such as ‘evidence-based policy-making’ (see Cairney, 2016 for an 
overview), ‘best practice’ approaches, or incremental theories of ‘appropriate’ reform (see 
Olsen, 2017 for a recent example). The resulting analyses and proposals may have many 
merits, but a general problem is that normative standards often remain implicit or 
unaccounted for. 
 
We suggest that attempts to develop and improve on normative political theory as ‘non-ideal 
theory’ – a theory that is relevant and applicable under real world conditions – are more 
promising (Swift and White, 2008).1 Recently, different efforts have been made under the 
heading of democratic or political ‘realism’ (Galston, 2010: 385). With a lineage from 
Hobbes, and with Bernhard Williams (2005) as a central reference point, realism in this 
incarnation is explicitly anti-utopian insofar as its interest is in developing an ‘empirically 
informed critique of social and political phenomena’ (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 348), starting 
from historically and politically sensitive judgments when building normative concepts (Hall, 
2017: 296-7). Furthermore, it has as its aim to prevent ‘the worst’, ‘the first duty of political 
leaders’ (Galston, 2010: 394). The approach has, however, been criticized, in part for 
withdrawing from a normative engagement altogether, in part for its limited and unclear 
account of critical standards (Maynard and Worsnip, 2018). 
  
Other proposals for normative, but non-ideal theory seem to avoid these charges (Sen, 2009; 
Waldron, 2016). Still, for our purposes, the theory of deliberative systems stands out as 
particularly promising with its focus on democratic institutions and practices. Arguably, 
                                               
1 Ideal theory is based on explicitly unrealistic assumptions. The point of such theory is to discuss the moral 
defensibility of ideals irrespective of their feasibility (Cohen, 2008; Valentini, 2012). 
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providing a ‘normative and empirical account of the democratic process as a whole’ has been 
the point for deliberative democratic theory all along (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 24). However, 
in their influential manifesto for a systemic approach to deliberative democracy, Mansbridge 
et al. (2012: 25f) describe three phases in the development of deliberative democracy theory. 
A first phase was concerned with elaborating and justifying the ideal of deliberation. The 
second phase introduced empirical studies (see Carpini et al., 2004 for an overview). Political 
scientists searched for traces of deliberation in political institutions, and tested deliberative 
potentials in experimental settings (e.g. Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). Attention was also given 
to the role of citizens in the public sphere. In the early 2000s, political communication 
researchers turned to online discussion forums. Their studies tended to focus on the 
deliberative qualities of such discussions (e.g. Graham and Witschge, 2003; Albrecht, 2006), 
and on how other forms of communication besides deliberation matter (e.g. Black, 2009). 
Communication scholars also studied forum designs, considering features that could heighten 
deliberative performance (e.g. Wright and Street, 2007). Later, interest turned to social media 
– overwhelmingly to Facebook (Stoycheff et al., 2017), and Twitter (e.g. Author 2, 2013). 
The idea was to study the extent to which citizens actively participated in public deliberation 
through new means of mediated communication. Interesting findings aside, an overall 
limitation of empirical studies of the second phase was its focus on deliberation in more or 
less isolated instances, whereas insights into the effects for the overall performance of 
democracy remained underexplored. Moreover, to the extent that findings from these studies 
informed policy recommendations, they were bound to be limited to a concern for 
maximizing the deliberative potential of each case.  
 
The systemic approach, then, represents a third phase, aiming to re-connect the field to 
questions of large-scale societies. As a whole, a deliberative system is defined to 
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‘[encompass] a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem-solving – through 
arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 4-5). Such 
systems should furthermore fulfil three functions: the ethical function of promoting ‘mutual 
respect among citizens’, the participatory function of promoting ‘an inclusive process of 
collective choice’, and the epistemic function of ensuring ‘reasonably sound decisions’ 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012: 11-12). Moreover, all functions are considered equally decisive for 
system-level legitimacy, but individual processes or institutions need not fulfill all three 
functions equally well. The idea is rather to develop an adequate division of labour where 
deficits in one part of the system can be compensated for in other parts of the system. 
Conflicts can, however, occur between the deliberative system’s different functions, not least 
between the participatory and the epistemic functions (e.g. Chambers, 2017): In concrete 
cases there can be tensions between including all affected and ensuring decision making 
maximally based on ‘facts and logic’ (Christiano, 2012). 
 
The systems turn has inspired a range of studies, including of practices in the public sphere. 
Several studies look at civil society groups, analysing how social change organizations use 
different communication strategies when interacting with the government (Dodge, 2009), or 
discussing phenomena along the boundaries of the deliberative system such as civil 
disobedience and other types of disruptive protests (Smith, 2016). The role of non-
deliberative modes of communication, such as toxic and vilifying narratives, has also received 
attention (e.g. Boswell, 2015). Case studies have scrutinized how public discourse on specific 
policy issues link together with formal parts of the system through processes of meaning or 
information transmittance from the citizens to the core (e.g. Engelken-Jorge, 2017; Boswell et 
al., 2016). Further attention has also been given to the role of ‘mini publics’ as intermediaries 
between the general citizenry and formalized policy-making (e.g. Bohman, 2012; Lafont, 
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2015). Theoretically, the emphasis has been on how the public sphere best contributes to a 
deliberative system when left as a sphere of ‘unrestricted communication’ with substantial 
independence from the spaces of decision making, broad participatory credentials, and freed 
from undue influences from elite and expert biases and framing power (Erman, 2016: 78; 
Landwehr, 2015; Chambers, 2017).  
 
3. Citizens’ role in the online public sphere: improving on a promising approach 
There can be no doubt that the third phase of scholarship on deliberative democracy generally 
improves on some of the shortcomings of the previous phases. It continues the valuable turn 
to empirical studies of the second phase and the focus on developing deliberative democracy 
as non-ideal theory. As promised, scholarship of the third phase also concentrates more 
committedly on implications for democracies at ‘the large scale’, instead of approaching cases 
of deliberative democratic practice in isolation from its system surroundings. Valuable 
empirical insights have been provided, and theoretical interrogations have explicated and 
discussed with respect to normative assumptions and implications that were underspecified 
and under-problematized in the initial formulation of the systems perspective. 
 
Still, when we look at the third phase’s analyses of the public sphere, and of online media use 
in particular, some shortcomings remain. First, the theoretical elaborations of the public 
sphere tend to have a certain participatory bias especially vis-à-vis epistemic dimensions. 
Contributors have rightly directed our attention to how technocratic orientations and elites’ 
framing power can compromise the democratic qualities of public sphere deliberations 
(Landwehr, 2015; Erman, 2016). However, surprisingly, given phase one’s emphasis on the 
twin participatory and epistemic justification of deliberative democracy (for a classical 
formulation, see Habermas, 1996), and how empirical studies of deliberation in different 
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public spheres and civil society contexts include a range of epistemic parameters (for 
overviews, see Bächtiger et al, 2018: 273-460), theoretical accounts have tended to underplay 
the decisive epistemic function of the public sphere to ensure sufficiently ‘truth-sensitive’ 
political processes, and the need for a cognitive division of labour, and the active role of 
experts,2 not only in government or as government advisors (Christiano, 2012), but also in the 
public sphere. Arguably, this underplaying goes against the spirit of the Habermasian public 
sphere model, where problems are sluiced from citizens at the periphery of society towards 
the decision-making entities in the centre, and where experts play a key role in the process 
from the initial problem-identification among citizens, towards a justifiable political issue 
(Chambers, 2017: 274).   
 
Secondly, not only is there a bias in favour of the participatory function, relative to the 
epistemic function, several of the third phase’s analyses of public sphere deliberations fail to 
consider how participatory features of the public sphere must be seen in the context of 
participatory features elsewhere in the deliberative system. Here, the mainstream appears to 
contradict one of the key tenets of deliberative systems theory. Surely, from a systems 
perspective, scores on particular indicators, measuring for example the inclusiveness and 
representativeness of online deliberations, must take into account the actual participatory 
levels on other arenas (in civil society, governance structures, the mass media etc.), and the 
fact that participatory patterns vary immensely between countries and regions. Measures 
should moreover be sensitive to the specificities of institutional features. This requires an 
‘emic approach’ that considers ‘culture and system specific indicators’ (for example Wessler, 
                                               
2 Experts are persons who have substantially more knowledge than other people within a specific domain (see 
Goldman, 2011; and Author 1, 2018; 2019 on the ‘lay-expert problem’). 
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2008, 9),3 and that evaluates scores on media participation indicators, for example low online 
participation, while looking at participation in other channels. However, despite an impressive 
state of the art in studies of deliberative democracy (Bächtiger et al., 2018), the overall 
impression is still that such ‘emic’ concerns and a consistent systemic point of view that 
considers participation in one sub-system in relation to participation in other sub-systems, are 
underdeveloped, or play a secondary role, for example in studies of online deliberations (see 
the overview in Strandberg and Grönlund, 2018). 
 
A further problem is how the participatory function of the public sphere is to connect to mass-
mediated public communication. While the identification of a problem might come from an 
individual in the periphery, the sluicing towards the centre, as well as the input from experts, 
tends in existing contributions to be interpreted as something to be handled primarily if not 
exclusively by mediated communication aimed at the public at large (see even Chambers, 
2017). Certainly, in order to amass a legitimate public opinion in a large, complex society, 
such mass mediation is needed. Yet, at the same time, such a model risks downplaying the 
political communication among citizens, in private and public settings, where they interpret, 
discuss, argue over, ridicule or praise the mediated messages they are exposed to. If we are to 
properly assess the role of citizens in a public sphere according to a Habermasian sluice-
model, we should also acknowledge the participatory practices that are interwoven in people’s 
everyday lives, be it simply informal political talk, or different kinds of civil society 
involvement (Verba and Nie, 1972). Ignoring the different civic engagements that often 
happen in parallel with the uptake of mass-mediated public communication can easily lead us 
to exaggerate the role of elites and experts in the formation of opinions and will.    
                                               
3 ‘Does ‘public deliberation’ mean the same thing in all countries (…), and can it therefore be measured with the 
same indicators (etic approach)? Or does public deliberation (…) take different forms in the countries considered 
so that culture- and system-sensitive indicators must be developed (emic approach)?’ (Wessler, 2008, 9). 
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Thirdly, as for the mediated public communication, including the use of online media, the 
third phase has inadequately acknowledged how such media is used for multiple purposes, 
and prematurely ranked ‘speaking’ above ‘listening’, and participation above information-
seeking. As we have argued, empirical research, in earlier as well as later work on 
deliberative democracy, has aptly highlighted the varied shapes of actors’ communication. 
Yet, there is still an over-emphasis on the speakers – those partaking in more or less 
deliberative communication. Facing the digital age, researchers have tended to spend energy 
on conceptualizing the new ‘active’ modes of using media – the making, participating, 
playing, remixing, and producing. The result has been creative terms such as ‘produser’ 
(Bruns, 2008), while those using online media to read and watch are still labelled ‘lurkers’ 
(e.g. Baker, 2018). However, we would argue that listening is an equally important part of 
deliberation. Not only is communication meaningless without a recipient; any process towards 
better understanding and building of opinions requires listening. Listening is also needed for 
the ‘internal-reflective’ aspects of deliberation, the ‘weighing of reasons for and against a 
course of action […] within the head of each individual’ (Goodin, 2000: 81). ). Importantly, 
the value of listening depends on the quality of the information – whether it is freely 
accessible and based on sound arguments and facts. 
 
To get at a more nuanced view of how citizens partake in the formation of collective agendas 
and public opinion, we should thus distinguish between those communicating a message and 
those listening, or acting as an audience. In practice, and especially in online media, these two 
aspects can take many forms and be somewhat challenging to discern, but we can generally 
distinguish between political expression or participation, on the one hand, and informational 
use, on the other. The former includes comments to political actors’ websites, expressions of 
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support (such as ‘liking’ in social media), or the sharing of political information. The latter 
contains news consumption, and exposure to other forms of more or less explicitly political 
information. 
 
Moreover, even early studies found connections between information seeking online and 
political participation (e.g. Shah et al., 2005). More recent studies have focused on social 
media, and meta-analyses conclude that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between information use of social media and political participation (Skoric et al., 2016; 
Boulianne 2009). Boulianne (2015) studied Canadian youth and found consumption of news 
in social and other online media to increase civic awareness, which in turn affected political 
participation, including voting. A study using British survey data from 2001, 2005 and 2010 
found similar patterns, highlighting that informational use of online media ‘is positively and 
consistently associated with political talk for those lower in political interest’ (Bimber et al., 
2014). Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2014) analysed U.S. national panel data to look for effects of 
social media news consumption for political participation. Their findings concerning offline 
participation (including attending rallies, talking to public official in person and attending 
town hall meetings) indicate direct effects from such social media news use. Recent studies 
have also sought to focus on a particular aspect of informational use of social media, namely 
the accidental kind (sometimes referred to as ‘news will find me’ perceptions as opposed to 
citizens actively seeking out news). A survey-based study from Germany, Italy and the UK 
found accidental exposure to political information in social media to be positively correlated 
to political participation online, and that this correlation is stronger among the less interested 
(Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016).4 Such studies tell us that a nuanced concept of the role of the 
citizen in the public sphere needs to pay attention to the informational uses of online media. 
                                               
4 Heiss and Matthes (2019) do not find such equalizing effects of incidental exposure, but do find a general 
positive main effect of such exposure to political information on what they call low-effort digital participation. 
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Fourthly, even if the systems approach clearly encourages scholarship to formulate reform 
initiatives and policy recommendations to improve on democratic credentials, prescriptions 
tend to be general and disregard existing institutional prerequisites and path-dependencies in 
the system to be reformed. The literature on online deliberation specifically, have tended to 
focus on general features of online participants’ ‘motivations’ in combination with rather 
abstract inputs to deliberation-inducing ‘design of deliberative settings’ (Stransberg and 
Grönlund, 2018: 366-370 , see also Dryzek et al., 2019). This underplays how not only 
participants’ ‘motivations’ but also the proper ‘design’ of deliberative bodies and procedures 
will often vary across polities and over time. Studies that work comparatively, and that 
interestingly rely on institutional and contextual variables when accounting for participatory 
patterns online, have so far engaged less with implications of such comparisons for policy 
recommendations (for example Engelken-Jorge, 2018). Arguably, this state of affairs can be 
connected to a more long-standing lack of attention to the role of feasibility constraints in 
discussions of viable policies. Theorists who have given this issue proper systematic 
treatment, emphasize, however, the importance of taking into account the availability and 
stability of different ‘institutional schemes’, and propose reforms based on the comparative 
merits of these schemes, rather than introducing blueprints of design solutions (Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith, 2012; see also Rothstein, 1998; Lindvall, 2017). The systems turn in 
deliberative democracy has yet to fully integrate such insights.  
 
From these four critiques, we can derive a revised version of deliberative systems theory that  
                                               
We should not ignore the associated potentially problematic aspects of citizens’ reliance on social media for 
political information. For instance, there seems to be a negative connection between specific modes of engaging 
with news in social media – sometimes referred to as ‘news will find me’ perceptions as opposed to citizens 
actively seeking out news – and political knowledge and interest (Gil de Zúñiga & Diehl, 2019). Others find 
connections between using social media for news and the spreading of misinformation (Valenzuela et al., 2019). 
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i) assesses practices in the public sphere, focusing on both participatory and epistemic 
credentials, and recognizing the role of experts in ensuring public deliberations with a 
sensible informational basis;  
ii) considers citizens’ online participation in light of the actual and varying participatory 
levels on significant arenas elsewhere in the system, and as embedded in everyday life and 
connected to offline civic engagements;  
iii) acknowledges how online media is used for multiple purposes, and recognizes the 
significance of ‘listening’ and information seeking for deliberative quality and political 
participation; and  
iv) approaches policy reform in a way that takes into account pre-existing institutional 
schemes. 
 
Arguably, this revised version of the theory is more in line with our intuitions of good 
democratic practice as a practice that does not disregard ‘facts and logic’, and that requires of 
citizens that they ‘listen’ and seek information and not only ‘speak’ their opinions. 
Highlighting the epistemic demands on a well-functioning public sphere, our amendments 
also seem to bring the systems turn more in touch with acute challenges connected to ‘fake 
news’ and ‘post-truth politics’ (see also Dahlgren, 2018). Furthermore, the revised version is 
more consistent with the systems impetus, and with features of the theory of deliberative 
democracy in its original formulation. As such, it remains a normative democratic theory that 
is critical and pluralism-sensitive, but, importantly, increased consistency in this case also 
contributes to increased feasibility. That practices of the public sphere are interwoven, and 
participation in different political sub-system interrelated, are among the basic contentions of 
the deliberative democracy approach, accentuated by the systems turn, and contentions like 
these were what made this approach attractive from a feasibility perspective in the first place. 
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Finally, our theory version is better attuned with research findings about what facilitates 
democratic practice, including how online information seeking induces political participation, 
and our knowledge of effective policy reform. This increases the real-world relevance of our 
amended theory, and brings it more in line with feasibility considerations. 
 
4. Online media use in Norway: testing practical significance and feasibility 
However, revisions of a theory intended for scrutiny of real world cases should also have 
practical significance. In what follows, we show that our amendments make a difference for 
the assessment of a concrete case. We argue moreover that the changes in assessments that 
our theoretical revisions result in, are sound. Generally, a normative theory is strengthened if 
it turns out that assessments of a particular case derived from the theory are compatible with 
our broader set of moral intuitions,5 but concrete assessments can also make us aware of over- 
or under-idealized assessment standards. Here we concentrate on the latter, and on testing for 
feasibility or over-idealization. In this endeavor, we take it that assessments derived from a 
valid normative, but non-ideal democratic theory that deviates largely and in ways that are 
hard to account for from available qualified empirical evaluations of democratic quality and 
from general knowledge of conditions that likely facilitate democratization, is prima facie 
over-idealized.  
 
Our testing case is online media use in Norway, a case well suited for our purpose. Norway is 
a rich country with a long popular democratic tradition and a comparatively educated 
electorate, few major social conflicts, and a well-functioning civil service (Knutsen, 2017; 
Engelstad et al., 2018). It ranks at the top of international human development and gender 
                                               
5 The standard method of testing a normative political theory is to assess the compatibility of their implications 
with our moral intuitions. Incompatibility should spur a process where theory and intuitions are revised into a 
“reflective equilibrium” based on “considered judgments” (see List and Valentini, 2018). 
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equality indexes, corruption levels are low, and levels of social trust relatively high 
(Rothstein, 2011). As for the Norwegian media system, it is characterized by early 
development of editorial freedom, active state regulation based on the arm’s length principle, 
and relatively low levels of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). These are all 
factors generally conducive to democratization and to the development of a relatively well-
functioning sphere of mediatized political communication, and unsurprisingly, Norway is a 
consistently high achiever on international democracy rankings.6 This does not imply that the 
Norwegian political sphere is unlikely to suffer from non-trivial democratic deficits. Still, 
univocal negative assessments of the quality of Norwegian democracy are assessments that 
depart largely and in ways that are hard to explain from reasonable expectations, and we 
assume that theoretical approaches producing such assessments are prima facie questionable.  
 
Below we present research findings relevant for assessing the practical significance and 
feasibility of the revised version of the deliberative systems approach. The presentation is 
organized around our four points of theoretical critique, and mainly based on our own recent 
and ongoing studies based on original data. A primary source is a survey conducted among a 
representative sample of the Norwegian adult population, undertaken in December 2017 
(N=2050)7. The survey covers use of different media, but has a particular focus on the role of 
social media (see Hovden, in review; Author 2, forthcoming; Kantar TNS, 2018 for details). 
The survey provides us with basic descriptive statistics on social media use and attitudes 
towards the role of online and social media for public debate. When relevant, we also draw on 
                                               
6 Norway is currently number one on both The EUI Democracy Index (see 
https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index) and the Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy Index (see 
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-
dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf). It also tops The World Press Freedom Index (see https://rsf.org/en/ranking), 
and is second on the most recent Freedom in the World ranking (see https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2019).  
7 The survey was conducted as part of the research project [name removed] headed by [Author]. 
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other recent empirical work on social media use and developments in different spheres of 
Norwegian democracy. 
 
Epistemic merits and the informational basis of online deliberations 
A significant finding in research on online media use in Norway so far is that people’s interest 
in actively participating in the production of content (e.g. in “user-generated journalism”) is 
limited, as is the interest in exploiting the interactive potential of these platforms for public 
communication (e.g. Karlson et al., 2018). This is a consistent finding in survey-based 
studies, which typically report that less than one in ten use social media to post links to news 
about society or politics (on Facebook use in Norway, see Enjolras et al., 2013: 49). Results 
from our survey show that two thirds report never having written longer posts on society or 
politics, nor started discussion threads or debates in social media (Author 2, forthcoming). 
Almost two thirds of Norwegians report social media use during an average day, but they 
predominantly think of social media as tools for private communication and the forging of 
social bonds (Author 2, forthcoming). This resonates with other studies from Scandinavian 
countries, which have repeatedly found that those who get attention in online political debates 
are predominately those with a pre-established offline positions (Author 2, 2014). In our 
survey, while 80% of Norwegians reported use of Facebook in 2017, only 14% said they used 
Twitter (far less than Instagram and even Snapchat), and while Facebook users tend to be 
evenly distributed across income categories, educational levels, and geography, Twitter users 
are heavily skewed towards high income, high educational levels, and urban areas.  
 
Qualitative analyses of those who actively participate in political debate on social media in 
Norway substantiates the impression of a small group of relatively resourceful and 
knowledgeable actors who make use of the new opportunities provided by social media to 
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participate in continued public discussion. Vatnøy (2017) interviewed representatives from 
media businesses, politics and academia in Norway, and found that informants see themselves 
as part of ‘socially and discursively distinguishable networked publics’, as a ‘tweetocracy’ 
and a ’Facebook-public’ (Vatnøy, 2017, i). Moreover, whereas Twitter is rife with humour 
and irony, highlighting social and cultural distinctions, Facebook is regarded as allowing for 
the engagement in ‘deeper and more consistent reasoning and debate’ (Vatnøy, 2017: 182). 
Both features of social media discourse could alienate outsiders. At the same time, findings 
indicate that people are content with a certain division of labour in the public sphere. 
Combining a survey and focus groups, Karlsson et al. (2018: 591) not only found that 
‘journalistic gate-keeping is still to a large extent appreciated by the audience’, but also that 
users became more skeptical of news as user participation increased.  
 
The deliberative systems approach in whatever version stresses the importance of citizens’ 
participation and broad inclusion. From this perspective, the above findings of the limited 
overall utilization of social media platforms’ participatory and interactional potential, and of 
the significant social stratification of online media use, are both worrisome. That users report 
to have less trust in news as user participation increase may be interpreted as an obstacle to 
the development of a truly democratic political culture.  
 
According to our revised version of the systems approach, the epistemic credentials of the 
organization and interactions in the online sphere must be considered as well. In particular, 
we have argued for the role of expert users in providing a knowledge basis for more informed 
online deliberations. From this perspective, the substantive presence of knowledgeable actors 
online is promising at the outset, and the fact that users recognize the benefits of a certain 
cognitive division of labour in the public sphere is not a problem, but rather an asset. Online 
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and social media may even come to improve the epistemic quality of expert discourse, to the 
extent that these media allow for rapid exchanges, easy references to sources, and the nursing 
of social bonds and respect between participants. At the same time, we should not forget the 
potential epistemic costs of expert dominance in public communication, given what we know 
of the varied set of biases and mistakes that may haunt expert discourse, and how ‘lay 
expertise’ can valuably challenge and correct taken-for-granted knowledge (Author 1, 2018, 
see also Trenz, 2016, on the limitations of “elite narratives”). 
 
Interpreting online participation in context 
According to our revised criteria, evaluations of participatory levels online must also take into 
account participatory trends on significant arenas elsewhere in the system. Here, research 
findings are diverse. There are, on the one hand, signs of decreased participation and limited 
inclusion in the offline spheres of Norwegian politics. One example is how national civil 
society organizations lose members, and are becoming more professionalized and lobby-
oriented (Alm Andreassen, 2016). Another example is the shrinking pool of active members 
in political parties (Allern et al., 2015), while academics, policy-professionals and consultants 
increasingly are involved in policy advice (Author 1, 2017). On the other hand, there are 
participatory trends that head in the opposite direction. There is, for example, an increase in 
the number of ad-hoc pressure groups and organizations that work on local and regional 
levels, as well as experimentation with novel forms of cooperation between the public sector 
and civil society (Alm Andreassen, 2016), including new participatory mechanisms for the 
inclusion of lay perspectives in policy-making (Author 1, forthcoming). Other examples are 
the high voter turnouts, and the central role still played by unions and other interest 
organizations in corporatist bargaining (Engelstad et al., 2018).  
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Overall, and once more, our amended version of the deliberative systems approach enables us 
to trace significant participatory challenges in this relatively well-functioning regime. Yet, in 
contrast to the non-amended version, our revised approach put these challenges in the context 
of a more mixed set of participatory trends.  
 
Taking into account how online participation must be interpreted in light of offline contexts, 
civic engagements and everyday concerns, bring additional nuances to our assessments. Two 
lines of study are illustrative in this regard. First, the offline world still offers opportunities for 
talking about politics, and earlier studies have found these venues to be more important than 
social media (e.g. Linnaa Jensen, 2013 on Denmark). Our survey data on activities connected 
to the latest Norwegian general election illustrate that such face-to-face discussion remains 
important also in Norway: 33% report discussing the election at work, and 57% have 
discussed it with friends or family members. By comparison, 12% shared or commented on 
news about the election or Norwegian politicians in social media, and 7% reported to have 
written statements in social media about the election (Author 2, forthcoming). However, we 
do find such activities to be higher among elites, for example, when we find a higher 
probability for those with higher levels of education to have discussed the election with 
friends and family (71% among higher educational levels vs 43% among the lowest), or to 
have discussed the election at work (50% vs 11%). 
 
These survey findings thus remind us of the range of offline arenas for political talk. Here 
citizens from varied social groups participate considerably and more frequently than they do 
online. In contrast to the non-amended version of the deliberative systems approach, our 
revised version prescribes us to consider this when assessing the implications of online 
participatory patterns. At the same time, the fact that participation in political talk depends on 
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educational or other resources, on- and offline, is clearly a problem from the perspective of 
democratic quality, according to both unrevised and revised criteria. 
 
Secondly, our study of Norwegians’ uses of social media documents a widespread reluctance 
to partake in public debate online, not least due to the risk of ‘context collapse’, i.e. that one’s 
message reaches well beyond its immediate and intended audience in a way that is hard to 
control. Importantly, this does not necessarily imply turning away from all forums for 
political discussion online. Recent work (from the Netherlands) shows how messaging 
applications or services that allow for communication among smaller groups matter for news 
provision and engagement with public issues (Swart et al., 2018). Such services can on the 
one hand provide carefully created spaces where smaller communities or interest groups can 
deliberate. If successful, they can limit some of the problems our respondents report with 
participation on Twitter and Facebook: the harsh tone, and the lack of room to develop a 
thought or change opinion. On the other hand, a consistent retreat from open online forums 
may increase the risk of segmentation of the online public sphere, and contribute to 
deliberative biases and even polarization (Sunstein, 2018).  
 
Hence, implications of these research findings are not straightforward from the perspective of 
democratic quality. Yet, the concern of ‘context collapse’ exemplifies our point regarding 
how online political activities are embedded in a range of offline norm sets and 
considerations. The offshoot is once more multi-faceted and balanced assessments. 
 
Listening and informational use 
As indicated, social media is widely in use by the Norwegian population. The value given to 
such media for news provision is moreover quite high across the population. Our 2017 survey 
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data shows that 66% of respondents agree or partly agree with statements about the usefulness 
of social media as news providers. However, if we look at the distribution between groups 
with different educational and income levels, we see variations: 72% of respondents from the 
lowest educational category agree or partly agree that social media are useful news providers, 
compared to 56% of the highly educated. Similarly, those with low levels of income tend to 
agree more often that social media are important providers of news. Widening the scope 
beyond news confirms the impression: when asked about the practice of ‘following’ persons, 
sites or groups they think are important for political debate, we find this to be more 
widespread among those with low income (Author 2, forthcoming).  
 
This seems to indicate – albeit tentatively – that social media is an important site of ‘listening’ 
and a source of political information, especially for those groups which have been found to 
participate less as ‘speakers’ in mediated public deliberation. From the perspective of our 
revised criteria of democratic quality, this is significant and promising, given what we know 
of information’s role for the quality of citizens’ ‘deliberation within’ and of the relationship 
between online information seeking and offline political participation. This contrasts with the 
un-amended version that encourages analyses of social stratification in media use based 
exclusively on parameters of active participation. Two caveats remain, though: First, as we 
showed above, the transfer from informational audience modes to participation both on- and 
offline is skewed towards certain groups (with high educational levels, etc.). Second, for the 
reliance on social media as news providers to be helpful, the news available and accessed 
should be of a certain quality.  
 
Reforming available institutional schemes 
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On the policy side, contributors to the third phase of deliberative democracy theory 
recommend the establishment of consciously rigged deliberative forums that can feed into 
ordinary political processes. In the case of Norwegian online democracy, this implies pooling 
public resources into digital discussion platforms designed to ensure the inclusion of lay 
knowledge, and equal participation across social groups. Generally, this is a recommendation 
that our revised approach can also support, on the condition that such platforms are set up 
with participatory, as well as epistemic credentials in mind. This includes ensuring the 
presence and active participation of expert deliberators when needed, and moderation that 
allows for ‘speaking’, but also for ‘listening’ and information seeking. 
 
However, according to our amended approach, feasible recommendations should take into 
account the robustness and efficiency of pre-existing policies and organizations. In the 
Norwegian case, institutionalized political processes are already in place, known both to have 
significant democratic merits and to affect policy- and decision-making substantively. One 
example is the tripartite bargaining system where the unions, employers and the government 
negotiate wage schemes and social standards (Engelstad et al., 2018). Another example is the 
system of temporary advisory commissions, composed of civil society representatives, experts 
and civil servants, and appointed by the government early in policy-making processes to 
analyse policy issues and recommend policies (Author 1, 2017). Arguably, in such a context, 
and from the perspective of making policies that are not only normatively sound, but also 
effective, there is a case for focusing more on incorporating democratizing online 
mechanisms in the everyday routines of these relatively well-functioning institutions, than on 
designing artificial deliberative settings on the outside. 
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Generally, the quality of online democracy in large-scale societies could be affected by a 
broad set of policies. Reform of welfare and educational policy may, for example, have larger 
effects over time on social inequalities in media use than the establishment of deliberative 
forums, and in a social-democratic welfare regime reforms along these lines work with 
existing path-dependencies (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Engelstad et al., 2018).  
 
For the development of online democracy specifically, media policy in particular may 
moreover prove effective. An example is how to increase the informational use of media 
across social groups, a normative concern our theoretical critique has brought up as decsive. 
Traditionally, Nordic countries have relied on press support schemes and publicly funded 
broadcasting services (e.g. Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Syvertsen et al., 2014). Yet, two 
contemporary trends complicate this approach. First, in a post-broadcasting age, it becomes 
increasingly easy to avoid independent and trustworthy political information through digital 
media personalization (e.g. Prior, 2007 on the US; Blekesaune et al., 2012 on Europe). 
Second, quality political information online, such as that provided by journalism, increasingly 
costs money for the end user. Research has furthermore shown a tendency that low 
willingness to pay for news on- and offline is linked to low educational levels (Author 2, 2019 
on the Nordic countries; Benson, 2019 on the US). The danger then is that certain groups rely 
on an information environment where free social media plays a key role – which means 
algorithmic selections and good conditions for propagandists. Against this background, a 
recent Norwegian commission report on media policy (NOU 2017:7) proposes to strengthen 
the chances of exposure to quality political information for those less probable to actively 
seek it by channeling public support to provide information that remains free for end users. 
The already existing public service broadcasting policies that support cross-media production 
of news as well as cultural content are proposed as one way to pursue this aim. Another way 
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is to strengthen commercial online news providers’ incentives to produce free, high quality 
materials (through direct or indirect measures, such as tax reduction). Once more, this 
illustrates a mode of developing policies that build on well-known schemes, in this case in 
Norwegian media regulation, while at the same time revising them in light of new challenges 
and for the sake of democratic reform. 
 
Critical, yet feasible 
Overall then, this section has shown point by point not only how our revisions of deliberative 
systems theory’s approach to the normative role of the public sphere and digital political 
behaviour makes a difference in practice, but also that this approach in its un-amended 
version seems to suffer from over-idealization. Without our revisions, the systems theory, as 
outlined in recent contributions, makes us produce a one-dimensional and ‘dark’ diagnosis of 
state of affairs in Norwegian online democracy, at odds with reasonable expectations, and 
offers a blueprint policy recommendation that is likely to have limited effects. In contrast, our 
revised theory results in a more multi-faceted and mixed assessment of democratic quality, 
more in line with expectations to a high-achieving polity, and offers context-sensitive input to 
policy reforms likely to be more effective.  
 
5. Conclusion 
With a focus on the normative role of the public sphere, and how to assess citizens’ online 
media use from a democratic perspective, this paper has scrutinized deliberative systems 
theory with an emphasis on feasibility considerations. We have argued that recent 
contributions to the development of this theory i) underplay the epistemic features of the 
public sphere and the role of expert media users; ii) paradoxically fall short of interpreting 
participatory levels from a systems perspective; iii) have a limited conception of the role of 
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social and online media; and iv) take an over-abstract approach to policy reform that is 
unlikely to be effective. The paper has on the basis of these four theoretical critiques offered a 
revised version of the deliberative systems theory, and we have argued that this version seems 
to strike a better balance between ideal requirements and feasibility. This contention, 
however, needs better grounding. Relying on a concrete case – online democracy in Norway – 
the paper has shown that our critical points have practical significance, but it also tested for 
over-idealization with and without our theory revisions. It turns out that the amended version 
of the deliberative systems approach produces a diagnosis of Norwegian online democracy 
more in line with sensible expectations to a known high achiever. We take this to prima facie 
indicate feasibility. 
 
Our endeavor has limitations. First, we have taken the deliberative systems approach to be 
promising, and suggested a way to refine it further. Yet, our paper does not offer a full 
theoretical assessment of this approach, its pros and cons, and its merits relative to other 
contributions to normative, non-ideal democratic theory. Second, we have argued that our 
theoretical amendments make the systems approach more feasible, and that the approach in its 
un-amended version seems to have built in over-idealized assessment standards. Yet, the 
question of how to strike a proper balance between ideal requirements and feasibility 
considerations, need closer theoretical scrutiny and to be considered on the basis of more 
empirical cases. Third, the provided assessment of Norwegian online democracy is tentative. 
The analysis of our survey data is at an early stage, and we need more studies of central 
issues, for example on the epistemic quality of the contributions of expert online users. 
 
Still, we believe our paper contributes to highlighting the promises of the deliberative systems 
approach as a non-concessive, yet applicable branch of non-ideal normative theorizing. 
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However, we have also argued that the approach needs non-trivial revisions for it to reach its 
fuller potential. The provided theoretical critique is particular tailored towards the challenge 
of assessing online media use, a democratic practice with increasing salience. Our critical 
points on the need to include both participatory and epistemic criteria, analyze participatory 
patterns in context, on the role of information seeking and “deliberation within”, etc. have 
however also relevance for assessments of democratic quality more broadly. Our paper 
furthermore gives feasibility considerations, an issue often disregarded in discussions of 
normative political theory, a consistent focus, and offers an example of a case based testing of 
feasibility, where we systematically utilize the features of a high achiever. Our endeavor on 
this point, suggests a more general method for feasibility testing that deserves to be tried out 
more and further developed. Finally, our paper does not intend to offer anything close to a full 
assessment of Norwegian online democracy, but to provide sufficient information to illustrate 
our theoretical discussions’ practical significance and substantiate our prima facie assessment 
of feasibility. On the way, we have also indicated issues where our knowledge is scattered; 
this suggests paths for further research. Generally, we have tried with this paper to make 
normative political theory and social science research fronts come together. Such cross-
disciplinary cooperation is still too scarce, but in the spirit of deliberative systems theory and 
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